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The Singapore Law Gazette

Analytical Framework for Sentencing: Harm, Culpability and Aggravating/Mitigating Factors

This article surveys the recent Supreme Court judgments with regard to the analytical framework for sentencing: (a) harm, (b) culpability, (c) aggravating factors and (d) mitigating factors. It navigates the contours of the two-step sentencing bands framework in Ng Kean Meng Terence v Public Prosecutor [2017] SGCA 37. Next, it explores three models of the two-step sentencing bands framework.Finally, it examines the differences between “culpability-increasing factors” and “general aggravating factors”.

Introduction

At its heart, the interplay of (a) harm, (b) culpability, (c) aggravating factors and (d) mitigating factors (the analytical framework) lends itself well to sentencing. Harm and culpability are the pillars on which we place the cross-beams of aggravating and mitigating factors.

This article surveys the recent Supreme Court judgments with regard to the analytical framework.1 See also The Honourable Attorney-General’s Speech, Opening of the Legal Year 2018 (Singapore, 8 January 2018) at (25). It navigates the contours of the two-step sentencing bands framework in Ng Kean Meng Terence v Public Prosecutor [2017] SGCA 37.2 See also the five-step sentencing framework in Logachev Vladislav v Public Prosecutor (2018) SGHC 12 at (71)–(84), which is broadly similar to the two-step sentencing bands framework in Ng Kean Meng Terence v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGCA 37 at (73(a), (c) and (d)). Next, it explores three models of the two-step sentencing bands framework. Finally, it examines the differences between “culpability-increasing factors” and “general aggravating factors”.

Analytical Framework

The analytical framework enables a systematic evaluation of the relevant considerations in fashioning an appropriate sentence. The contours of the analytical framework were explored in Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat [2017] SGHC 123, Public Prosecutor v Aw Tai Hock [2017] SGHC 240, and Stansilas Fabian Kester v Public Prosecutor [2017] SGHC 185.3Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat (2017) SGHC 123 at (41)–(49). Public Prosecutor v Aw Tai Hock (2017) SGHC 240 at (29)–(40). Stansilas Fabian Kester v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGHC 185 at (47)–(48), (74) and (91). See Mohamed Faizal, Wong Woon Kwong and Sarah Shi, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and Sentencing (2017) 18 Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review 415 at (14.71)–(14.76).

By way of example, for the sentencing of drink-driving cases, the analytical framework may be presented graphically as follows:4Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat (2017) SGHC 123 at (41)–(49). Public Prosecutor v Aw Tai Hock (2017) SGHC 240 at (29)–(40). Stansilas Fabian Kester v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGHC 185 at (47)–(48), (74), (75), (78) and (91).

The eclectic mix of cases employing the analytical framework is testament to the framework’s versatility:

  1. Section 44(1)(a) of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act: Huang Ying-Chun v Public Prosecutor [2018] SGHC 269.
  2. Professional misconduct under Section 53(1)(d) of the Medical Registration Act: Wong Meng Hang v Singapore Medical Council and Other Matters [2018] SGHC 253.
  3. Section 17(1) of the Medical Registration Act: Neo Ah Luan v Public Prosecutor [2018] SGHC 188.
  4. Maid abuse under Section 323 read with Section 73(2) of the Penal Code: Tay Wee Kiat and Another v Public Prosecutor and Another Appeal [2018] SGHC 42.
  5. Cheating at play under Section 172A(2) of the Casino Control Act: Logachev Vladislav v Public Prosecutor [2018] SGHC 12.
  6. Causing grievous hurt by negligent act which endangered human life under Section 338(b) of the Penal Code: Tang Ling Lee v Public Prosecutor [2018] SGHC 18.
  7. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt under Section 325 of the Penal Code: Public Prosecutor v BDB [2017] SGCA 69.
  8. Voluntarily causing hurt under Section 323 of the Penal Code: Public Prosecutor v Lim Yee Hua [2017] SGHC 308.
  9. Aggravated outrage of modesty under Section 354(2) of the Penal Code: GBR v Public Prosecutor [2017] SGHC 296.
  10. Section 28(b) read with Section 29(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act: Seng Hwee Kwang v Public Prosecutor.5Seng Hwee Kwang v Public Prosecutor (Oral Judgment, 15 February 2017, Magistrate’s Appeal No 9114/2016).
  11. Offences under the Workplace Safety and Health Act: Nurun Novi Saydur Rahman v Public Prosecutor v [2018] SGHC 236, and Public Prosecutor v GS Engineering and Construction Corp [2016] SGHC 276.
  12. Section 182 of the Penal Code: Koh Yong Chiah v Public Prosecutor [2017] 3 SLR 447.
  13. Drug trafficking under Section 5 of the Misuse of Drugs Act: Vasentha d/o Joseph v Public Prosecutor [2015] SGHC 197, Public Prosecutor v Lai Teck Guan [2018] SGHC 151, and Soh Qiu Xia Katty v Public Prosecutor [2018] SGHC 260.
  14. Sections 140, 146, and 148 of the Women’s Charter: Poh Boon Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2014] SGHC 186.6 For completeness, see also Ding Si Yang v Public Prosecutor (2015) SGHC 8 (Sentencing Guideline Framework of Annex A at (28)).

This is perhaps unsurprising as the two principal parameters which a sentencing court would generally have regard to in evaluating the seriousness of a crime are: (a) the harm caused by the offence, and (b) the offender’s culpability.7 Lim Ying Luciana v Public Prosecutor and Another Appeal (2016) 4 SLR 1220 at (28), Public Prosecutor v Tan Thian Earn (2016) 3 SLR 269 at (19), Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat (2017) SGHC 123 at (41), and Public Prosecutor v Ganesan Sivasankar (2017) SGHC 176 at (33) and (53)–(56). See also Public Prosecutor v Law Aik Meng (2007) 2 SLR(R) 814 at (33).

“Harm” is a measure of the injury which has been caused to society by the commission of the offence.8Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat (2017) SGHC 123 at (41). Public Prosecutor v Aw Tai Hock (2017) SGHC 240 at (33). Public Prosecutor v Yeo Ek Boon Jeffrey (2017) SGHC 306 at (57). Harm may comprise “physical harm” and “psychological harm” for maid abuse cases under Section 323 read with Section 73(2) of the Penal Code.9Tay Wee Kiat and Another v Public Prosecutor and Another Appeal (2018) SGHC 42 at (70)–(72). Harm may also include serious economic loss to the victim under Section 17(1) of the Medical Registration Act.10Neo Ah Luan v Public Prosecutor (2018) SGHC 188 at (69).

In assessing the level of harm or potential harm, the sentencing court should be careful not to double-count any factors which may already have been taken into account in assessing the level of culpability: Neo Ah Luan v Public Prosecutor [2018] SGHC 188 at [70].11 See also Public Prosecutor v Raveen Balakrishnan (2018) SGHC 148 at (87).

“Culpability” is a measure of the degree of relative blameworthiness disclosed by an offender’s actions and is measured chiefly in relation to the extent and manner of the offender’s involvement in the criminal act.12Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat (2017) SGHC 123 at (41). Public Prosecutor v Aw Tai Hock (2017) SGHC 240 at (35). Public Prosecutor v Yeo Ek Boon Jeffrey (2017) SGHC 306 at (57). See also Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (6th Edition, 2015, Cambridge University Press) at (4.5).

Two-Step Sentencing Bands Framework

The two-step sentencing bands framework is found in Ng Kean Meng Terence v Public Prosecutor [2017] SGCA 37 at [73(a), (c) and (d)].13 See also the five-step sentencing framework in Logachev Vladislav v Public Prosecutor (2018) SGHC 12 at (71)–(84), which is broadly similar to the two-step sentencing bands framework in Ng Kean Meng Terence v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGCA 37 at (73(a), (c) and (d)).

At the first step, the Court should have regard to the offence-specific factors in deciding which band the offence in question falls under. Offence-specific factors comprise factors going towards: (a) the harm caused by the offence; and (b) the offender’s culpability. The categories may not always be watertight. For instance, the degree of planning and premeditation and the level of sophistication, were categorised as offence-specific factors going towards the offender’s culpability in Logachev Vladislav; yet, the High Court observed that they may also relate to the harm caused by the offence in so far as they affect the likelihood of harm: Logachev Vladislav v Public Prosecutor [2018] SGHC 12 at [38].

Once the sentencing band, which defines the range of sentences that may usually be imposed for an offence with those features, is identified, the Court has to go on to identify precisely where within that range the present offence falls in order to derive an “indicative starting point”.

At the second step, the Court should have regard to the aggravating and mitigating factors which are personal to the offender to calibrate the sentence. These offender-specific factors comprise other aggravating and mitigating factors which do not directly relate to the commission of the offence.14Logachev Vladislav v Public Prosecutor (2018) SGHC 12 at (34). Ng Kean Meng Terence v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGCA 37 at (39(b)).

One model of the two-step sentencing bands framework can be found in drug trafficking and importation cases where the quantity of the drugs indicates the potential harm to society. In this regard, the indicative starting sentence — based on the quantity of the drugs (viz potential harm) — may be adjusted upward or downward to take into account the offenders’ culpability and other aggravating and mitigating factors. Essentially, harm is the central element for such cases.

Examples of these cases include Vasentha d/o Joseph v Public Prosecutor [2015] SGHC 197 at [43]–[48] (drug trafficking)15 The sentencing guidelines for the trafficking of diamorphine are found in Vasentha d/o Joseph v Public Prosecutor (2015) SGHC 197 at (47). The High Court — in Loo Pei Xiang Alan v Public Prosecutor (2015) SGHC 217 at (17) and Public Prosecutor v Tan Lye Heng (2017) SGHC 146 at (125) — considered the conversion scale or exchange rate for drug trafficking between diamorphine and methamphetamine/ cannabis respectively. See also Lee Jwee Nguan and Mohamed Faizal, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and Sentencing (2015) 16 Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review 396 at (14.110). and Suventher Shanmugam v Public Prosecutor [2017] SGCA 25 at [29]–[30] (drug importation).16 See also the Court of Appeal decisions in Pham Duyen Quyen vPublic Prosecutor (2017) SGCA 39 at (56), and Suventher Shanmugam v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGCA 25 at (31). For completeness, see Public Prosecutor v Nimalan Ananda Jothi (2018) SGHC 97 at (33)–(37), and Public Prosecutor v Adri Anton Kalangie (2017) SGHC 217 (and CCA 34/2017).

In similar vein, for voluntarily causing grievous hurt under Section 325 of the Penal Code, the seriousness of the injury caused (viz harm) is a good indicator of the gravity of the offence and guides the court in determining the indicative starting point for sentencing. The indicative starting sentence may then be adjusted upward or downward to take into account the offenders’ culpability and other aggravating and mitigating factors: Public Prosecutor v BDB [2017] SGCA 69 at [55].17 See Mohamed Faizal, Wong Woon Kwong and Sarah Shi, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and Sentencing (2017) 18 Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review 415 at (14.128)–(14.129).

Another model of the two-step sentencing bands framework can be found in fatal accident cases under Section 304A(a) of the Penal Code. For such cases, as the harm is the death of the victim, the harm is generally uniform. Accordingly, what sets such cases apart is, in the vast majority of cases, determined primarily by the accused’s culpability.18 “(T)here will be exceptional cases where the harm caused by the offence can also be used to determine both the applicable category and where the particular case falls within the applicable presumptive sentencing range. One example of this would be where more than one death is caused, as in the present case”: Public Prosecutor v Ganesan Sivasankar (2017) SGHC 176 at (56). After considering the accused’s culpability, a sentencing court takes into account other aggravating and mitigating factors: Public Prosecutor v Ganesan Sivasankar [2017] SGHC 176 at [54].19 See Mohamed Faizal, Wong Woon Kwong and Sarah Shi, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and Sentencing (2017) 18 Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review 415 at (14.103)–(14.106).

Finally, in Public Prosecutor v Yeo Ek Boon Jeffrey [2017] SGHC 306 at [57],20 This case dealt with the offence of voluntarily causing hurt to a public servant (police officers and public servants who are performing duties akin to police duties at the material time) under Section 332 of the Penal Code. the High Court noted that the:

“offence-specific and offender-specific aggravating and mitigating factors are necessarily factored into the analysis within the harm and culpability considerations themselves”.21 See Mohamed Faizal, Wong Woon Kwong and Sarah Shi, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and Sentencing (2017) 18 Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review 415 at (14.122)–(14.125).

An example of this approach22 See Public Prosecutor v Yeo Ek Boon Jeffrey (2017) SGHC 306 at (57). may be found in Public Prosecutor v Sakthikanesh s/o Chidambaram and Ors [2017] SGHC 178 at [50]–[56], where the High Court held that exceptional performance during National Service was not a mitigating factor, as it reduces neither the defaulter’s culpability nor the harm he had caused by his offence.

In sum, the above discussion can be condensed as follows:

S/No1st Step2nd StepCases
1Harm + CulpabilityAggravating/ Mitigating FactorsNg Kean Meng Terence v PP [2017] SGCA 37
2HarmCulpability
+
Aggravating/ Mitigating Factors
Vasentha d/o Joseph v PP [2015] SGHC 197
Suventher Shanmugam v PP [2017] SGCA 25
PP v BDB [2017] SGCA
3Culpability (Primary Factor)
+
Harm (Exceptional Cases)
Aggravating/ Mitigating FactorsPP v Ganesan Sivasankar [2017] SGHC 176
4“Offence-specific and offender-specific aggravating and mitigating factors are necessarily factored into the analysis within the harm and culpability considerations themselves”PP v Yeo Ek Boon Jeffrey [2017] SGHC 306
PP v Sakthikanesh s/o Chidambaram and Ors [2017] SGHC 178

Next, we segue to examine the differences between “culpability-increasing factors” and “general aggravating factors”.

Culpability-Increasing Factors and General Aggravating Factors

Culpability-increasing factors directly relate to the commission of the offence per se. They are offence-specific.

For example, for outrage of modesty cases (both aggravated and simpliciter), the offence-specific factors that increase the accused’s culpability include the degree of sexual exploitation and the circumstances of the offence: GBR v Public Prosecutor [2017] SGHC 296 and Kunasekaran s/o Kalimuthu Somasundara v Public Prosecutor [2018] SGHC 9.23Kunasekaran s/o Kalimuthu Somasundara v Public Prosecutor (2018) SGHC 9 at (48). GBR v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGHC 296 at (27)–(29). The circumstances of the offence include (a) the presence of premeditation, (b) the use of force or violence, (c) the abuse of a position of trust, (d) the use of deception, (e) other aggravating acts accompanying the outrage of modesty (e.g. showing the victim a pornographic film before outraging her modesty or using sedating drugs), and (f) the exploitation of a vulnerable victim: GBR v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGHC 296 at (29).

For the offence of dangerous driving under Section 64(1) of the Road Traffic Act, the factors increasing the accused’s culpability would include a particularly dangerous manner of driving. As illustrations, the aggravating factors identified in Public Prosecutor v Hue An Li [2014] SGHC 171, ie speeding, drink-driving and sleepy driving, would clearly contribute to this, as would driving while using a mobile phone.24Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat (2017) SGHC 123 at (41). See also Public Prosecutor v Ganesan Sivasankar (2017) SGHC 176 at (54). Finally, see Mohamed Faizal, Wong Woon Kwong and Sarah Shi, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and Sentencing (2017) 18 Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review 415 at (14.103)–(14.106). In addition, if the dangerous driving was deliberate (for instance, in “hell riding” cases), this would also indicate a higher level of culpability.25Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat (2017) SGHC 123 at (41). See also Public Prosecutor v Ganesan Sivasankar (2017) SGHC 176 at (54).

General aggravating factors do not directly relate to the commission of the offence per se. They are offender-specific. These factors include the number of charges taken into consideration, relevant antecedents demonstrating recalcitrance, and the evident lack of remorse.26GBR v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGHC 296 at (39). Logachev Vladislav v Public Prosecutor (2018) SGHC 12 at (37) and (64)–(66).

Mitigating factors include a timeous plea of guilt, voluntary restitution, cooperation with the authorities, and the presence of a mental disorder or intellectual disability on the offender’s part that relates to the offence.27GBR v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGHC 296 at (39). Logachev Vladislav v Public Prosecutor (2018) SGHC 12 at (37) and (67)–(70). For completeness, see Amardeep Singh s/o Gurcharan Singh, Sentencing Reform in Singapore: Are the Guidelines in England and Wales a Useful Model?, (2018) 30 SAcLJ 175 at (36)–(38). For completeness, in Stansilas Fabian Kester v Public Prosecutor [2017] SGHC 185, the High Court stated the need to justify the mitigating value of public service and contributions by reference to the four principles of sentencing — retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and prevention.28Stansilas Fabian Kester v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGHC 185 at (94)–(101). See Mohamed Faizal, Wong Woon Kwong and Sarah Shi, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and Sentencing (2017) 18 Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review 415 at (14.47)–(14.48).

Conclusion

In the final analysis, the analytical framework lends itself well to a systematic evaluation of the relevant considerations in fashioning a condign sentence.

The author would like to thank DJ Ronald Gwee and DJ John Ng for their helpful comments and suggestions. All errors remain the author’s alone. All views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views of his organisation.

Footnotes   [ + ]

1. See also The Honourable Attorney-General’s Speech, Opening of the Legal Year 2018 (Singapore, 8 January 2018) at (25).
2. See also the five-step sentencing framework in Logachev Vladislav v Public Prosecutor (2018) SGHC 12 at (71)–(84), which is broadly similar to the two-step sentencing bands framework in Ng Kean Meng Terence v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGCA 37 at (73(a), (c) and (d)).
3.Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat (2017) SGHC 123 at (41)–(49). Public Prosecutor v Aw Tai Hock (2017) SGHC 240 at (29)–(40). Stansilas Fabian Kester v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGHC 185 at (47)–(48), (74) and (91). See Mohamed Faizal, Wong Woon Kwong and Sarah Shi, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and Sentencing (2017) 18 Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review 415 at (14.71)–(14.76).
4.Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat (2017) SGHC 123 at (41)–(49). Public Prosecutor v Aw Tai Hock (2017) SGHC 240 at (29)–(40). Stansilas Fabian Kester v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGHC 185 at (47)–(48), (74), (75), (78) and (91).
5.Seng Hwee Kwang v Public Prosecutor (Oral Judgment, 15 February 2017, Magistrate’s Appeal No 9114/2016).
6. For completeness, see also Ding Si Yang v Public Prosecutor (2015) SGHC 8 (Sentencing Guideline Framework of Annex A at (28)).
7. Lim Ying Luciana v Public Prosecutor and Another Appeal (2016) 4 SLR 1220 at (28), Public Prosecutor v Tan Thian Earn (2016) 3 SLR 269 at (19), Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat (2017) SGHC 123 at (41), and Public Prosecutor v Ganesan Sivasankar (2017) SGHC 176 at (33) and (53)–(56). See also Public Prosecutor v Law Aik Meng (2007) 2 SLR(R) 814 at (33).
8.Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat (2017) SGHC 123 at (41). Public Prosecutor v Aw Tai Hock (2017) SGHC 240 at (33). Public Prosecutor v Yeo Ek Boon Jeffrey (2017) SGHC 306 at (57).
9.Tay Wee Kiat and Another v Public Prosecutor and Another Appeal (2018) SGHC 42 at (70)–(72).
10.Neo Ah Luan v Public Prosecutor (2018) SGHC 188 at (69).
11. See also Public Prosecutor v Raveen Balakrishnan (2018) SGHC 148 at (87).
12.Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat (2017) SGHC 123 at (41). Public Prosecutor v Aw Tai Hock (2017) SGHC 240 at (35). Public Prosecutor v Yeo Ek Boon Jeffrey (2017) SGHC 306 at (57). See also Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (6th Edition, 2015, Cambridge University Press) at (4.5).
13. See also the five-step sentencing framework in Logachev Vladislav v Public Prosecutor (2018) SGHC 12 at (71)–(84), which is broadly similar to the two-step sentencing bands framework in Ng Kean Meng Terence v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGCA 37 at (73(a), (c) and (d)).
14.Logachev Vladislav v Public Prosecutor (2018) SGHC 12 at (34). Ng Kean Meng Terence v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGCA 37 at (39(b)).
15. The sentencing guidelines for the trafficking of diamorphine are found in Vasentha d/o Joseph v Public Prosecutor (2015) SGHC 197 at (47). The High Court — in Loo Pei Xiang Alan v Public Prosecutor (2015) SGHC 217 at (17) and Public Prosecutor v Tan Lye Heng (2017) SGHC 146 at (125) — considered the conversion scale or exchange rate for drug trafficking between diamorphine and methamphetamine/ cannabis respectively. See also Lee Jwee Nguan and Mohamed Faizal, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and Sentencing (2015) 16 Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review 396 at (14.110).
16. See also the Court of Appeal decisions in Pham Duyen Quyen vPublic Prosecutor (2017) SGCA 39 at (56), and Suventher Shanmugam v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGCA 25 at (31). For completeness, see Public Prosecutor v Nimalan Ananda Jothi (2018) SGHC 97 at (33)–(37), and Public Prosecutor v Adri Anton Kalangie (2017) SGHC 217 (and CCA 34/2017).
17. See Mohamed Faizal, Wong Woon Kwong and Sarah Shi, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and Sentencing (2017) 18 Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review 415 at (14.128)–(14.129).
18. “(T)here will be exceptional cases where the harm caused by the offence can also be used to determine both the applicable category and where the particular case falls within the applicable presumptive sentencing range. One example of this would be where more than one death is caused, as in the present case”: Public Prosecutor v Ganesan Sivasankar (2017) SGHC 176 at (56).
19. See Mohamed Faizal, Wong Woon Kwong and Sarah Shi, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and Sentencing (2017) 18 Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review 415 at (14.103)–(14.106).
20. This case dealt with the offence of voluntarily causing hurt to a public servant (police officers and public servants who are performing duties akin to police duties at the material time) under Section 332 of the Penal Code.
21. See Mohamed Faizal, Wong Woon Kwong and Sarah Shi, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and Sentencing (2017) 18 Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review 415 at (14.122)–(14.125).
22. See Public Prosecutor v Yeo Ek Boon Jeffrey (2017) SGHC 306 at (57).
23.Kunasekaran s/o Kalimuthu Somasundara v Public Prosecutor (2018) SGHC 9 at (48). GBR v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGHC 296 at (27)–(29). The circumstances of the offence include (a) the presence of premeditation, (b) the use of force or violence, (c) the abuse of a position of trust, (d) the use of deception, (e) other aggravating acts accompanying the outrage of modesty (e.g. showing the victim a pornographic film before outraging her modesty or using sedating drugs), and (f) the exploitation of a vulnerable victim: GBR v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGHC 296 at (29).
24.Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat (2017) SGHC 123 at (41). See also Public Prosecutor v Ganesan Sivasankar (2017) SGHC 176 at (54). Finally, see Mohamed Faizal, Wong Woon Kwong and Sarah Shi, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and Sentencing (2017) 18 Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review 415 at (14.103)–(14.106).
25.Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat (2017) SGHC 123 at (41). See also Public Prosecutor v Ganesan Sivasankar (2017) SGHC 176 at (54).
26.GBR v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGHC 296 at (39). Logachev Vladislav v Public Prosecutor (2018) SGHC 12 at (37) and (64)–(66).
27.GBR v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGHC 296 at (39). Logachev Vladislav v Public Prosecutor (2018) SGHC 12 at (37) and (67)–(70). For completeness, see Amardeep Singh s/o Gurcharan Singh, Sentencing Reform in Singapore: Are the Guidelines in England and Wales a Useful Model?, (2018) 30 SAcLJ 175 at (36)–(38).
28.Stansilas Fabian Kester v Public Prosecutor (2017) SGHC 185 at (94)–(101). See Mohamed Faizal, Wong Woon Kwong and Sarah Shi, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and Sentencing (2017) 18 Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review 415 at (14.47)–(14.48).

District Judge, State Courts of Singapore