The Singapore Law Gazette

Civil Liability for Invasions of Privacy: Whither Singapore?

Intrusions upon privacy are becoming increasingly common in Singapore. Singapore has yet to establish a tort addressing this issue, although the SAL Law Reform Committee has proposed a tort of misuse of private information. Australia has also recently introduced a statutory tort of serious invasion of privacy. This article will argue for the need for a Singapore tort of intrusion upon seclusion, on top of the already proposed tort of misuse of private information, to cover more appropriately instances of intrusions upon privacy.

I. Introduction

Intrusions upon privacy are becoming increasingly common in Singapore. According to a 2024 survey, around 40% of Singaporeans admit to installing “stalkerware,” or apps which transmit data such as the location of the victim to the end user of the app. 27% experienced some form of “online stalking,” and 16% experienced non-consensual capturing of photos or videos of themselves.¹Renald Loh, “2 in 5 S’poreans have installed ‘stalkerware’, other tracking tools on partners’ phones to spy on them: Survey”, TODAY https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/2-5-sporeans-install-stalkerware-tools-partners-phones-spy-survey-2363586 (16 February 2024). In 2017, a man was arrested for public nuisance after being found secretly filming students from three separate girls’ schools.²https://mothership.sg/2017/10/man-taking-videos-of-girls-schools-students/

However, Singapore has yet to establish a tort of invasion of privacy. The Singapore Court of Appeal had the opportunity to consider introducing a tort protecting privacy in ANB v ANC³ANB v ANC and another and another matter (2015) 5 SLR 522. (ANB), but decided to leave a decision to another time.⁴ANB v ANC and another and another matter (2015) 5 SLR 522 at (23). Then in 2020, the Singapore Academy of Law’s Law Reform Committee published a report recommending the creation of a statutory tort of misuse of private information⁵Singapore Academy of Law Law Reform Committee, Report on Civil Liability for Misuse of Private Information (December 2020) (Authors: Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, Phang Hsiao Chung, Editor: Simon Constantine). (the SAL Report), notably rejecting a law covering intrusions upon seclusion.⁶Report on Civil Liability for Misuse of Private Information at para 2.5.

In contrast, Australia on 10 June 2025 created a new statutory tort of serious invasion of privacy.⁷Cth, Gazette, 16 December 2024 and Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2024 (Cth) s 2(1). The tort sets out two manifestations of invasion of privacy: intruding on the plaintiff’s seclusion,⁸Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) Sch 2 s 7(1)(a)(i). and misusing information that relates to the plaintiff.⁹Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) Sch 2 s 7(1)(a)(ii). Misuse of private information includes “collecting or disclosing private information about the plaintiff,”¹⁰Cth (Australia), Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: Final Report (ALRC Report 123) (ALRC Report 123, 2014) at 74 (President: Rosalind Croucher). while intrusion upon seclusion includes “physically intruding into the plaintiff’s private space or … watching, listening to or recording the plaintiff’s private activities or private affairs.”¹¹Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era at 74.

It is noted that the Singapore government has announced plans to create statutory torts to tackle online harms, such as “online harassment, intimate image abuse, and child abuse material.”¹²Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (4 March 2025), vol 95, https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/#/sprs3topic?reportid=budget-2593 (accessed 17 July 2025) (Murali Pillai, Minister of State for Law). However, this would still fail to cover physical manifestations of intrusion upon seclusion, such as covertly eavesdropping on a private conversation.

Given that the SAL Report has comprehensively advocated for a statutory tort of misuse of private information, this article will argue that Singapore ought to develop a tort of intrusion upon seclusion, on top of the already recommended statutory tort of misuse of private information. This article will illustrate how the current legal framework in Singapore is inadequate to cover intrusions upon seclusion, as well as show how a tort of intrusion upon seclusion would help to cover the gaps left in the present framework. It is further submitted that it does not matter whether the proposed tort of intrusion upon seclusion is introduced by statute or via the courts as a common law tort, as long as it covers the gaps left by the present legal framework.

II. Existing Approaches to Intrusion Upon Seclusion

The idea of civil liability for invasions of privacy is not a new concept to the common law world. This article will briefly explain the approaches in Australia, the UK, and the US, before exploring the Singapore approach.

A. The Australian Approach

Australia adopts a statutory tort of serious invasion of privacy which is actionable per se.¹³Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) Sch 2 s 7(2). It requires that:¹⁴Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) Sch 2 s 7(1).

1. The defendant invades the plaintiff’s privacy by either
   1. Intruding on the plaintiff’s seclusion, or
   2. Misusing information that relates to the plaintiff, and
2. A person in the position of the plaintiff would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances, and
3. The invasion of privacy was intentional or reckless, and
4. The invasion of privacy was serious, and
5. The public interest in the plaintiff’s privacy outweighed any countervailing public interest.

Only the intrusion upon seclusion version of this tort will be addressed, as the central focus of this article is intrusion upon seclusion.

The Attorney-General of Australia Mark Dreyfus, in his speech to the Australian House of Representatives at the second reading of the Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2024,¹⁵Cth (Australia), House of Representatives, Privacy and other Legislation Amendment Bill 2024, Second Reading (12 September 2024) (Mark Dreyfus, MP for Isaacs, Attorney-General and Cabinet Secretary). stated the rationales behind the new statutory tort. He stated that “the freedom to enjoy a private and family life … is critical to our wellbeing and dignity,”¹⁶Cth (Australia), House of Representatives, Privacy and other Legislation Amendment Bill 2024, Second Reading (12 September 2024), at 6654 (Mark Dreyfus, MP for Isaacs, Attorney-General and Cabinet Secretary). and that the law was intended to “keep pace with community expectations [of privacy] and advances in technology.”¹⁷Cth (Australia), House of Representatives, Privacy and other Legislation Amendment Bill 2024, Second Reading (12 September 2024), at 6654 (Mark Dreyfus, MP for Isaacs, Attorney-General and Cabinet Secretary).

B. The UK Approach

In the UK, intrusions upon seclusion are covered by the common law tort of misuse of private information, which covers both unlawful publication and unlawful access.¹⁸Nicholas McBride and Roderick Bagshaw, Tort Law (Pearson, 7^th Ed, 2024) at 426. For “access” cases of misuse of private information, the following test was laid down in Imerman v Tchenguiz¹⁹Imerman v Tchenguiz and others (2011) 2 WLR 592. (Imerman):²⁰Imerman v Tchenguiz and others (2011) 2 WLR 592 at (69).

1. The claimant obtains information
2. intentionally and
3. secretly,
4. knowing that the claimant reasonably expects the information to be private.

While it is noted that the tort in Imerman was framed as “breach of confidence”, it is submitted that it is more correct to frame the tort instead as an “access” case of misuse of private information.²¹Nicholas McBride and Roderick Bagshaw, Tort Law (Pearson, 7^th Ed, 2024) at 456. In Imerman, the claimant was in the midst of divorce proceedings with his wife.²²Imerman v Tchenguiz and others (2011) 2 WLR 592 at (11). His wife’s brother accessed the claimant’s computer without authorisation, gaining access to certain information,²³Imerman v Tchenguiz and others (2011) 2 WLR 592 at (12). which the wife then attempted to introduce as evidence in the divorce proceedings.²⁴Imerman v Tchenguiz and others (2011) 2 WLR 592 at (17). An injunction preventing the introduction of the information was granted on the grounds of breach of confidence.²⁵Imerman v Tchenguiz and others (2011) 2 WLR 592 at (141) and (147). As Nicholas McBride and Roderick Bagshaw point out, the wrong in Imerman was founded on an “expectation of privacy,”²⁶Nicholas McBride and Roderick Bagshaw, Tort Law (Pearson, 7^th Ed, 2024) at 456. and thus they argue that such acts of “wrongfully obtaining access to private information”²⁷Nicholas McBride and Roderick Bagshaw, Tort Law (Pearson, 7^th Ed, 2024) at 456. ought to fall within the ambit of the tort of misuse of private information instead.

This is further supported by the fact that the elements of the Imerman tort are completely different from the elements of breach of confidence set down in Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd,²⁸Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd (1969) RPC 41. as well as the Singapore test in I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting.²⁹I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting and others (2020) 1 SLR 1130. This is expected since they deal with completely different wrongs – the tort of breach of confidence deals with the revealing of private information, while the tort in Imerman deals with accessing private information. This makes the tort of breach of confidence completely inappropriate for invasions of privacy.

Moreover, McBride and Bagshaw point out that later cases have also characterised similar cases of covert collection of information as “misuse of private information cases.”³⁰Nicholas McBride and Roderick Bagshaw, Tort Law (Pearson, 7^th Ed, 2024) at 456. Thus from a legal theory point of view it seems more appropriate to create a whole new tort rather than to subsume invasions of privacy under the tort of breach of confidence.

C. The USA Approach

Section 652B of the Restatement of Torts (Second) states:

One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.³¹Restatement (Second) of Torts (American Law Institute, 1981) at s 652B.

Thus the elements are

1. Intrusion upon solitude or seclusion, physical or otherwise
2. Of another or his private affairs or concerns, and
3. The intrusion must be highly offensive to a reasonable person.

III. The Present Legal Framework in Singapore

The SAL Report notes that “[all] branches of the government have recognised the increasing need for legal protection of privacy and private information,”³²Report on Civil Liability for Misuse of Private Information at 1.17 pointing to the Government’s recognition of the importance of privacy. The SAL Report also raises examples to technological advancements such as the Internet and social media which “means it is only too easy for content that intrudes upon privacy to be shared online.”³³Report on Civil Liability for Misuse of Private Information at 1.15 Thus the reasons raised in other jurisdictions for establishing the torts of misuse of private information and intrusion upon seclusion are applicable to Singapore too.

Nonetheless, Singapore does not have similar torts directly addressing intrusions upon seclusion. Though some have argued that the present legal tools available are sufficient to cover such instances,³⁴See for example Mohammad Reza and Azri Tan, “Old Fashioned Breach of Confidence: The Singapore Approach to Privacy Law”, Singapore Law Gazette (August 2013). these in fact remain insufficient.

A. Inadequacies of the Protection from Harassment Act

As the SAL Report notes, the Protection from Harassment Act³⁵Protection From Harassment Act 2014 (2020 Rev Ed). (POHA) is unable to capture covert surveillance within its ambit.

The POHA creates four offences, which are also statutory torts following section 11 of the POHA:³⁶POHA s 11.

1. Intentionally causing harassment, alarm or distress under section 3.³⁷POHA s 3.
2. Causing harassment, alarm or distress (without intention) under section 4.³⁸POHA s 4.
3. Fear or provocation of violence under section 5.³⁹POHA s 5.
4. Unlawful stalking under section 7.⁴⁰POHA s 7.

The SAL Report points out that section 3 and 4 of the POHA may not capture such acts as they may not amount to “threatening, abusive or insulting” behaviour.⁴¹Report on Civil Liability for Misuse of Private Information at para 1.44. While section 7 does prohibit “keeping the victim or a related person under surveillance”, it requires the accused to be engaged in a “course of conduct”, which may not capture singular instances of surveillance.⁴²Report on Civil Liability for Misuse of Private Information at para 1.48.

A comparison will be made here to the English case of Kaye v Robertson⁴³Kaye v Robertson (1991) FSR 62. (Kaye). In that case, a journalist and a photographer from the defendant tabloid entered the room the claimant was warded in after a serious accident.⁴⁴Kaye v Robertson (1991) FSR 62 at 64. They took photographs of the plaintiff and his room, as well as a taped audio recording of the incident.⁴⁵Kaye v Robertson (1991) FSR 62 at 64. The Court of Appeal granted an injunction on the grounds of malicious falsehood preventing the publishing of anything which would suggest that the claimant had consented to any photographs taken of him or interviews conducted with him by the defendant tabloid while undergoing treatment.⁴⁶Kaye v Robertson (1991) FSR 62 at 65–66.

While a remedy was found in this particular instance, Bingham LJ noted that it was “fortunate”⁴⁷Kaye v Robertson (1991) FSR 62 at 70. that in Kaye a remedy in malicious falsehood happened to exist. If the facts were slightly tweaked, Mr Kaye may have found himself without any recourse despite the egregious invasion of his privacy. For example, if the journalists were instead fans (or haters) of the claimant, and wanted to enter his room and take pictures of him simply for their own knowledge or entertainment, there would be no malicious falsehood claim as there would be no publication in the first place.

The defendant’s conduct in Kaye would likely fall within the ambit of the Australian and American versions of the tort. In Singapore, the closest law to cover such an act of invasion of privacy without publication might be the POHA. On the facts of Kaye however, it may be difficult to establish a “course of conduct” for the purposes of section 7. Sections 3 and 4 may not be applicable as the defendants may not have had the intention of causing harassment, alarm or distress, but rather performed the act for their own entertainment or knowledge. Further, it is arguable that Mr Kaye could not be caused harassment, alarm or distress given his condition – Mr Kaye could not even recollect the incident of the journalist and photographer entering his room 15 minutes after they left.⁴⁸Kaye v Robertson (1991) FSR 62 at 64. Hence if there were no publication, there would be a similar lacuna left in Singapore.

Given this, a tort of intrusion upon seclusion might help to cover this gap in the law. Certainly bursting into someone’s private hospital room and taking photographs, videos and audio recordings of the person would be considered an “intrusion upon seclusion”. There is also a reasonable expectation of privacy in a private, single bed hospital ward (and even in a shared ward, certainly there is also a reasonable expectation of privacy, albeit to a lower extent). The act of intrusion was clearly intentional, and it is serious as anyone would be rightly highly aggrieved and offended at a similar act.

Critics may argue that the facts in Kaye might not fall within the ambit of the conception of the tort in the UK case of Imerman, as the requirement that the collection of information needs to be done secretly is not fulfilled. However, the secrecy requirement is controversial, with some academics suggesting that it ought to be done away with.⁴⁹See for example Nicholas McBride and Roderick Bagshaw, Tort Law (Pearson, 7^th Ed, 2024) at 456–457. It is submitted that the element of secrecy ought to be done away with if a similar tort is to be established in Singapore. This would allow the tort of intrusion of privacy to cover the facts of Kaye and thus provide an adequate remedy.

B. Inadequacies of the Tort of Private Nuisance

Given the UKSC’s ruling in Fearn v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery⁵⁰Fearn and others v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery (2024) AC 1. (Fearn) that visual intrusion or “overlooking” can constitute a private nuisance,⁵¹Fearn and others v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery (2024) AC 1 at (108). the tort of private nuisance might be an attractive option in protecting privacy interests. There, the Tate Modern had constructed a public viewing gallery which overlooked into the claimants’ flats, and opened the viewing gallery to public access.⁵²Fearn and others v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery (2024) AC 1 at (1)–(3). It was held that the use of the viewing gallery in that manner was an actionable nuisance.⁵³Fearn and others v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery (2024) AC 1 at (7) and (130). Indeed, some academics have posited that private nuisance can be a useful tool to guard against intrusions of privacy given the present lack of a statutory tort of intrusion upon seclusion.⁵⁴See for example Saw Cheng Lim and Aaron Yoong, “Throwing Stones in Glass Houses: Protecting Privacy under the Law of Nuisance” (2022) 28 Tort Law Review 145 at 152.

However, private nuisance is severely limited in dealing with cases of intrusions upon seclusion. Firstly, private nuisance is a land-based tort. The defendant’s actions must interfere with the claimant’s use of land – interference with the claimant’s personal comfort is irrelevant.⁵⁵Fearn and others v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery (2024) AC 1 at (11). Going through someone’s private notes, or recording them in public, would not be an interference with use of land, and thus would not fall within the ambit of private nuisance. Even an act more closely related to that in Fearn, for example taking pictures covertly of someone in their own home, may not be considered an interference with the use of the land, since the claimant would not have known of the defendant’s act until after the fact, meaning that they would still have had use of their home as if no one was surveilling them (regardless of how uncomfortable they may feel after the fact).

Secondly, the remedies currently available for private nuisance may not be entirely appropriate for intrusions upon seclusion. Injunctions would clearly be inappropriate as the suit would likely come after the intrusion upon seclusion has been completed. Damages however may be inadequate compensation. Legislative intervention may thus be necessary to enable the courts to order more appropriate remedies – for example, the deletion of recordings or pre-emptive injunctions against the use of information which was illegitimately gathered.

C. Inadequacies of the Computer Misuse Act

The Computer Misuse Act⁵⁶Computer Misuse Act 1993 (2020 Rev Ed). (CMA) may be a viable option to tackle situations involving invasions of privacy of a digital nature. Section 3 of the CMA makes unauthorised access to computer programs or data an offense.⁵⁷CMA s 3(1). This might cover cases such as Gulati v MGN,⁵⁸Gulati v MGN Ltd (2017) QB 149. where a tabloid hacked into multiple claimants’ phones in order to access their voicemails.⁵⁹Gulati v MGN Ltd (2017) QB 149 at (1). It might also be argued that the CMA sufficiently covers factual matrices similar to that in Imerman, thus making the tort in Imerman unnecessary.

However, the CMA fails to provide a civil remedy for such acts. This would mean the victim’s remedy lies solely in the hands of prosecutorial discretion, and a victim may not be able to get any vindication otherwise.

Further, the CMA would not cover physical invasions of privacy, for example a worker in an office going through their colleagues’ physical files. Even if the CMA provided a civil remedy, it would still be inadequate in covering all manifestations of invasion of privacy.

D. Inadequacies of the Tort in Wilkinson v Downton⁶⁰Wilkinson v Downton (1897) 2 QB 57.

The SAL Report suggests that “[s]ome forms of encroachment on privacy might well be vindicated through the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.”⁶¹Report on Civil Liability for Misuse of Private Information at para 1.22. However, the requirements for the tort, as articulated in Wilkinson v Downton (Wilkinson), may be too high to allow it to effectively cover instances of intrusion upon seclusion.

Firstly, as the SAL Report points out,⁶²Report on Civil Liability for Misuse of Private Information at para 1.48. the tort in Wilkinson requires that the claimant suffer a recognised psychiatric illness or some form of physical harm.⁶³O (A Child) v Rhodes and another (English PEN and others intervening) (2016) AC 219 at (88). However, intrusions upon seclusion obviously are unlikely to result in recognised psychiatric illness or physical harm, except perhaps in extreme scenarios.

Further, it requires intention to cause psychiatric or physical harm, with recklessness being insufficient.⁶⁴O (A Child) v Rhodes and another (English PEN and others intervening) (2016) AC 219 at (88). Where one is intruding upon another’s seclusion, the intruder is likely to want to hide their actions from the victim. This is necessarily contradictory to an intention to cause psychiatric or physical harm. If the victim is unaware of the act, clearly it would be impossible to suffer psychiatric or physical harm as a result of that act.

Consider for example the case of AXB v Metwally⁶⁵AXB v Hossam Metwally (2023) EWHC 2470. (AXB), where the defendant doctor took photographs of the claimant’s intimate areas during medical checkups.⁶⁶AXB v Hossam Metwally (2023) EWHC 2470 at (1). There, the claimant successfully claimed damages for the tort of misuse of private information.⁶⁷AXB v Hossam Metwally (2023) EWHC 2470 at (3) and (49). The tort in Wilkinson would be insufficient to cover a case like AXB, precisely because there would have been no intent to inflict psychiatric or physical harm if the defendant was collecting the images covertly.

Hence the Wilkinson tort is not a promising option to protect against intrusions upon seclusion.

E. Inadequacies of the Penal Code Offence of Voyeurism

The SAL Report suggests that there is no need for a tort of intrusion upon seclusion as the offence of voyeurism in the Penal Code⁶⁸Penal Code 1871 (2020 Rev Ed). (PC) would be sufficient to cover such cases.⁶⁹Report on Civil Liability for Misuse of Private Information at para 2.6. Proponents of this stand might point to AXB as an example of how voyeurism would cover instances of intrusion upon seclusion.

However, the offence of voyeurism fails to provide a civil remedy for intrusions upon seclusion. Having both civil and criminal remedies for the same act is important as it allows a claimant to gain compensation for any losses suffered personally. This fulfils the goal of corrective justice in tort law, which focuses on returning the victim to their pre-tort state as much as possible. This is not present in criminal law, which only focuses on retribution as against the perpetrator. Thus practical upshot of only having a remedy in criminal law is that the victim might still be left worse off after the act as compared to before.

For example, in AXB, the claimant chose to pursue a civil remedy on top of the defendant’s prison sentence for the same act.⁷⁰AXB v Hossam Metwally (2023) EWHC 2470 at (3)–(5). The claimant incurred cost of her own to seek treatment for the psychological impact of the tortfeasor’s acts, may have to seek continuous future treatment, and would suffer risks of losing her job or difficulty in finding a new one as a result of having to spend time to seek treatment. If the claimant were unable to claim the cost of treatment, it would result in her either being financially worse off than before due to having to pay for treatment out of pocket, or continue to suffer from the psychological impacts of the event without treatment. Thus, in the interest of corrective justice it is important for a civil remedy to be available alongside a criminal one.

Further, the offence of voyeurism only addresses offences which relate to “private acts,”⁷¹PC s 377BB. which refers to to circumstances where the person has their private bodily regions exposed, where they are using the toilet, showering, or bathing, or performing sexual acts not done in public.⁷²PC s 377C(3)(f). Obviously, not all instances of intrusion upon seclusion would relate to observing such “private acts”, for example the situation in Kaye, or perhaps a defendant going through a claimant’s rubbish to find information. Hence the offence of voyeurism is also insufficient to cover all instances of intrusion upon seclusion.

F. Inadequacies of the Personal Data Protection Act

A final tool of privacy protection might be the Personal Data Protection Act⁷³Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (2020 Rev Ed). (PDPA). Unfortunately, the PDPA applies only to organisations, with “individuals acting in a personal or domestic capacity”⁷⁴PDPA s 4(1)(a) and “employees acting in the course of employment”⁷⁵PDPA s 4(1)(b) explicitly excluded from the offence creating provisions of the act.⁷⁶PDPA s 4(1)(a) and (b) Intrusions of seclusion are often enacted by individuals against other individuals. Hence the PDPA is unlikely to apply to most cases of intrusion upon seclusion.

IV. Conclusion

It is argued that Singapore’s present legal framework is inadequate in dealing with cases of intrusions upon seclusion. POHA, the tort of private nuisance, the CMA, the tort in Wilkinson, the Penal Code and the PDPA are all insufficient to provide satisfactory remedies to cases of intrusion upon seclusion. A tort of inclusion upon seclusion would help to cover both physical acts of invasion of privacy like those in Kaye and instances of digital invasions of privacy such as location data collecting, as well as provide a civil remedy for instances of acts such as voyeurism which might have direct financial impacts on victims.

Building upon the suggestions of the SAL Report of a tort of misuse of private information, a tort covering acts of intrusion upon seclusion ought to be introduced in Singapore as well. Whether it is done in Parliament through statute or through the courts by establishing a common law tort similar to that in Imerman does not matter as long as it sufficiently covers the gaps identified in the present legal framework. It is however noted that the courts may be reluctant to establish a common law tort as “laws relating to privacy are complex and connected,”⁷⁷AXA Insurance Singapore Pte Ltd v Chandran s/o Natesan (2013) 4 SLR 545 at (10). with Choo Han Teck J opining that the task of establishing such a tort ought to be in the “well of Parliament”.⁷⁸AXA Insurance Singapore Pte Ltd v Chandran s/o Natesan (2013) 4 SLR 545 at (10).

Privacy protection is particularly important in Singapore, given the fact that Singapore is densely populated, leading to greater and easier opportunities to invade another’s privacy. It is hoped that with other jurisdictions taking steps to introduce privacy protections in tort, Singapore will do the same.

Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Professor Gary Chan, Principal Lecturer Ong Ee Ing, and the Editorial Team of SMU Lexicon for reviewing this article. All errors remain mine.