Disciplinary Tribunal Reports
Pursuant to section 93(5) of the Legal Profession Act, the Council of the Law Society is required to publish the findings and determination of the Disciplinary Tribunal in the Singapore Law Gazette or in such other media as the Council may determine to adequately inform the public of the same.
This summary is published pursuant to the requirement of section 93(5) of the Legal Profession Act.
In the Matter of Harjeet Singh, an Advocate and Solicitor
Pursuant to section 93(1)(c) of the Legal Profession Act (the Act), the Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) determined that cause for sufficient gravity exists for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act.
The disciplinary proceedings arose from information referred by the Court of Appeal hearing a dispute between the beneficiaries of an estate. In its judgment, the Court of Appeal expressed concern with the professional conduct of the Respondent, namely that there was potential conflict of interest as between the Respondent’s client and other siblings and that the Respondent failed to advise each of the siblings to seek independent legal advice.
The Respondent pleaded guilty to four amended charges and therefore the DT was obliged to determine whether a cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 of the Act.
Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal
The DT found no deliberate or wilful blindness on the part of the Respondent in his conduct of the estate matter. Accordingly, the DT determined that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity exists for disciplinary action against the Respondent under section 83 of the Act, he should be reprimanded or ordered to pay a penalty sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct committed. Further, the DT ordered that the Respondent bear the Society’s costs of the proceedings which is to be taxed if not agreed.
The Council’s Decision
The Council accepted the findings of the DT and accordingly reprimanded the Respondent.
In the Matter of Ismail Bin Atan, an Advocate and Solicitor
Pursuant to section 93(1)(c) of the Legal Profession Act, the Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) determined that cause for sufficient gravity exists for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Legal Profession Act (the Act).
On 18 November 2014 the Respondent was charged for outraging the modesty of his former employee pursuant to section 354(1) of the Penal Code. On 26 June 2015 the charge was compounded as the victim agreed to an offer by the Respondent to compound upon payment of $3000 and a letter of apology. Subsequently the Attorney-General referred information pursuant to section 85(3) of the LPA and the Council commenced disciplinary proceedings.
Three charges were preferred against the Respondent. The 1st charge set out the allegations relating to the outrage of modesty which was grossly improper conduct in the discharge of professional duties within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161). The 2nd and 3rd charges were premised on the same facts save that the 2nd charge referenced a breach of Rule 53A of Professional Conduct Rules whilst the 3rd charge referenced conduct unbecoming of an advocate and solicitor as a member of an honorable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the Act.
Findings by the DT
In his defence, the Respondent denied that he intended to outrage the modesty of his former employee. He alleged that he had made the offer to compound and provided the letter of apology on the advice of his counsel.
The victim gave evidence and the DT found that she had provided a clear and detailed account of what had transpired and that her evidence was corroborated by several factors, including the Respondent’s letter of apology where he apologised for the unwarranted physical contact imposed on her without her consent.
The DT determined under section 93(1)(c) of the Legal Profession Act that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists against the Respondent under section 83 of the Act.
The Council’s Decision
Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT and accordingly proceeded to apply for leave under section 98 of the Act for the Respondent to show cause as to why he should not suffer the sanctions set out in section 83 of the Act.
The Court of Three Judges
The Court of Three Judges ordered that the Respondent be struck off the roll of advocates and solicitors on 26 July 2017.
In the Matter of Ong Cheong Wei, Advocate and Solicitor
The Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) determined pursuant section 93(1)(c) of the Legal Profession Act (the Act) that cause of sufficient gravity exists under section 83(2)(a) for disciplinary action.
The Respondent was prosecuted on four charges for willfully making false entries in his income tax returns for the Years of Assessment 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2009. He pleaded guilty to two charges and the remaining two charges were taken into account and sentenced to eight weeks’ imprisonment and ordered to pay penalty of $118,341.78, being three times the amount of tax evaded. Council then referred his conduct to the Chairman, Inquiry Panel. The Inquiry Committee recommended that there should be a formal investigation by a Disciplinary Tribunal and Council applied to the Chief Justice pursuant section 89 of the Act to convene a DT.
The Respondent was charged that making false entries in his Income Tax returns for Years of Assessment 2007 and 2008, with intent to evade tax in breach section 96(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act (Cap. 134) implied a defect of character making him unfit for the profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(a) of the Legal Profession Act. The Respondent admitted to the charge.
Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal
The DT noted from Law Society of Singapore v Wong Sin Yee [2003] SGHC 197 and Law Society of Singapore vs Tham Yu Xian Rick [1999] SGHC 213 that not every criminal conviction implies a defect of character rendering the advocate and solicitor unfit for the profession. The DT noted that there was no known case in Singapore where an advocate and solicitor had been convicted under the same offence as the Respondent and where disciplinary action was taken against the errant solicitor. The closest reported case was Law Society of Singapore vs Lim Chor Pee [1988] SGDSC 1 where the respondent in the matter was convicted for making an incorrect return without reasonable excuse which offence did not involve dishonesty. The respondent in that case was not found guilty of misconduct by the Court of Three Judges.
The DT took the view that a tax evasion offence is a serious offence which implies a defect of character rendering the Respondent unfit for the profession and that it is an act of dishonesty. Referring to [107] in Chng Ghim Huat v PP [2000] SGHC, the DT shared the same view with the presiding Judge in the matter that a conviction for any other reason is equally a fraud on the State and an act of dishonesty. Taking the cue from several authorities from Australia and New Zealand, the DT noted that the respondents in these cases were said to be dishonest and unfit for the profession.
In examining the Respondent’s mitigation plea, DT took the view that an acrimonious divorce does not quite explain the filing of false tax returns and in fact the Respondent had admitted to filing false returns since 2002 which was well before the start of his divorce proceedings in 2008. Even if he was coerced by his ex-wife to file the false returns as stated in his mitigation plea, such conduct is inexcusable as he either condoned the dishonesty initiated by the wife or worse still, continued with it.
The DT determined pursuant to section 93(1)(c) of the Act that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 of the Act and made no order as to costs.
The Council’s Decision
Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT and accordingly proceeded to apply for leave under section 98 of the Act for the Respondent to show cause as to why he should not suffer the sanctions set out in section 83 of the Act.
The Court of Three Judges
The Court of Three Judges ordered that the Respondent be struck off the roll of advocates and solicitors on 9 November 2017.
In the matter of Ong Pang Meng, an Advocate and Solicitor
The disciplinary proceedings arose from a complaint as to how the Respondent had dealt with an interim payment of $20,000 received from insurers on behalf of the complainant, his client, for the client’s injury claim and the Respondent’s breach of his of duty of care and diligence to his client.
The Law Society preferred five charges for grossly improper conduct pursuant to section 83(2)(b), of the Legal Profession Act (the Act) for:
Requesting the complainant to transfer a sum of $20,000 into a joint account maintained by the Respondent and his wife and upon the receipt of the said sum, being client’s money as defined in the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Account) Rules, failing to transfer without delay the said sum into a client account in a breach of Rule 3(1) of the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Accounts) Rules (PCR);
Failing to maintain a reasonable level of communication with his client, the complainant, despite the client’s multiple attempts to contact him directly and indirectly in breach of Rule 17 of the PCR;
Failing to provide a statement of account to his client for a sum of $5,000, being client’s money, which he retained since on or about 6 May 2011 despite your client’s requests for a statement of account or return thereof in breach of Rule 19 of the PCR;
Without authority, instructions and/or consent, accepting a counter-proposal of $6,000 offered by the Plaintiff in respect of a matter in which his client was the Defendant;
Failing to explain in a clear manner the counter-proposal of $6,000 offered by the Plaintiff in respect a matter in which his client was the Defendant in breach of Rule 21 of the PCR.
Several alternative charges were also preferred.
Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal (DT)
On the 1st Charge, the DT was of the view that it is clear that Rule 3 of the Solicitors’ Account Rules read with Rule 9 of the said Rules requires client’s money to be deposited into a client account without delay unless the exceptions in Rule 9 apply and none of the exceptions were applicable in this case. The DT therefore found the Respondent in breach of Rule 3(1) of the said Rule and that the 1st and 1st alternative charge were made out.
On the 2nd Charge the DT was of the view that that the failure to maintain a reasonable level of communication with a client could also constitute a failure to keep the client reasonably informed of the progress of his matters under Rule 17 of the PCR. The DT also noted that there was a case of a breach of Rule 20(a) for failure to promptly respond to client’s telephone calls without good and sufficient reasons. Having examined the various correspondences between the parties, the DT was not convinced that the Respondent had communicated with the Complainant as to the counter-proposal when it was evident that he was ignorant or lacked knowledge of this. In any event, there were no telephone memos, files notes or records were offered by the Respondent and in their absence, the DT drew an adverse inference and found the 2nd charge, its alternative and further alternative made out.
On the 3rd Charge, the DT noted the admission by the Respondent that he failed to render a statement of account for the $5,000 retained as alleged fees even when the Complainant asked for a breakdown as to the said amount. The Respondent should have rendered a bill or a statement of account following requests made by the Complainant but admitted he did not and he was effectively in breach of Rule 19 of the Rules. In relation to the alternative charge concerning Rule 35(a) of the Rules, the DT referred found that there was no agreed fees and accordingly found the 3rd Charge, its alternative and further alternative made out.
As for the 4th Charge and its alternative are in substance the same, the DT elected to deal with the principal charge and its further alternative only. As the issue as to whether the counter-proposal by the Plaintiff was accepted without instructions, authority or consent of the Complainant, the DT noted that the evidence has been considered in the course of its deliberation on the 2nd Charge and consequently found the 4th Charge and its further alternative made out.
Finally, on the 5th Charge, the DT noted that it goes without saying that the Respondent had acted without the instructions, authority or consent of the Complainant in accepting the Plaintiff’s counter-proposal. In this regard, it must follow that the Respondent had failed to explain in a clear manner as to the counter-proposal. The DT took the view that the 5th Charge constituted a separate and distinct charge relating to a specific rule under the PCR, namely Rule 21. Accordingly, the DT found the 5th Charge and its alternative made out.
At the conclusion of the proceedings the DT determined under section 93(1)(c) of the Act that cause for sufficient gravity exists for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act.
The Council’s Decision
Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT and accordingly proceeded to apply for leave under section 98 of the Act for the Respondent to show cause as to why he should not suffer the sanctions set out in section 83 of the Act.
The Court of Three Judges
The Court of Three Judges ordered that the Respondent be suspended for a period of three months.
In the Matter of Ryan Lin Longcai, an Advocate and Solicitor
The Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) determined under section 93(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (the Act) that that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity exists for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act against the Respondent, a penalty in the range of $15,000 to $20,000 should be imposed.
The Complainants alleged that the Respondent had disclosed confidential information pertaining to the Respondent’s clients while using the WhatsApp mobile application.
Fourteen charges detailing the various disclosures and pursuant to section 83(2)(h) of the Act were preferred against the Respondent. The Respondent admitted to the charges at the onset of the proceedings.
Findings by the Disciplinary Tribunal (DT)
The DT found that the Respondent had breached the Rules on confidentiality but there was no evidence that the any of the clients had suffered any loss or damage as a result. Further, the DT acknowledged that the disclosures were related to personal communications between the Respondent and the 1st Complainant. In the DT’s view the Respondent was a foolish young man who in the pursuit of the 1st Complainant, forgot his duty to keep matters relating to his professional engagement confidential. His naiveté that these disclosures would not come back to haunt him when he ended his relationship with the 1st Complainant, attested to his youth and foolishness. However, this did not excuse the Respondent from what he had done.
The DT noted that whilst there were no cases in Singapore involving a breach of confidentiality which reached the DT stage, the DT was guided by several cases from the Commonwealth jurisdictions which suggested that the imposition of a fine was an appropriate form of punishment.
The DT determined that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity exists pursuant to section 93(1)(b) for disciplinary action, a fine in the range of $15,000 to $20,000 should be imposed on the Respondent.
The Council’s Decision
Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the DT and imposed a penalty of $15,000 on the Respondent.
