Disciplinary Tribunal Reports

October 2024

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Pursuant to section 93(5) of the Legal Profession Act, the Council of the Law Society is required to publish the findings and determination of the Disciplinary Tribunal in the Singapore Law Gazette or in such other media as the Council may determine to adequately inform the public of the same.

This summary is published pursuant to the requirement of section 93(5) of the Legal Profession Act.

In the Matter of Krishnamoorthi s/o Kolanthaveloo (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor

These proceedings arose out of a complaint made against the Respondent by one Mr Seto Wan Tarng (the Complainant). The Respondent was admitted to the Roll of Advocates and Solicitors of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Singapore on 8 July 1992 and was, at all material times, a partner of M/s K. Krishna & Partners (the Firm).
The Complainant had sustained personal injuries in a motor accident while driving his taxi. He sent his taxi for repairs at ComfortDelGro’s authorised car repairer, who referred him to the Firm regarding his personal injury claim.
The Complainant signed the Firm’s Warrant to Act on 17 May 2019, and received the Firm’s letter dated 30 May 2019 confirming their appointment to act and enquiring as to his medical condition.
The Respondent then received a specialist medical report on the Complainant’s injuries around 28 August 2019, but did not seek the Complainant’s instructions on it nor advise the Complainant on the quantum of damages claimable in respect of his injuries.
Without seeking the Complainant’s instructions or keeping him informed, between 26 September 2019 and 17 December 2019, the Respondent proceeded to exchange letters with NTUC Income (the insurers for the tortfeasor) (NTUC) to settle the Complainant’s claim, including counter-proposals by the Respondent. Copies of these correspondences were not provided to the Complainant by the Respondent or the Firm.
Throughout the entire duration of the Respondent’s handling of the claim:

1. the Respondent did not personally speak with the Complainant at any time; all dealings were between the Respondent’s paralegal, Mr Veknesh Mohanathass (Veknesh) or other staff and the Complainant;
2. none of the Firm’s emails to NTUC, or NTUC’s emails to the Firm, were furnished to the Complainant;
3. there was no email communication between the Firm and the Complainant; and
4. no reasonable advice was given to the Complainant regarding his personal injury claim, party-and-party costs and solicitor-and-client costs.

On 17 December 2019, Veknesh telephoned the Complainant to discuss NTUC’s counter-offer of 17 December 2019, during which

1. the Complainant was informed that NTUC had initially offered compensation of $2,000;
2. the Complainant informed Veknesh that he was unhappy with the figure of $2,000 and wanted a sum of at least $3,000;
Veknesh explained that it was unlikely that NTUC would increase their offer such that the Complainant would receive more than $3,000; and
at the end of the discussion, the Complainant agreed to accept a sum of $2,800.

On 18 December 2019, there was another telephone conversation between Veknesh and the Complainant, during which Veknesh informed the Complainant about NTUC’s counter-offer of 18 December 2019.
On 2 January 2020, the Firm sent a letter to the Complainant, enclosing NTUC’s discharge voucher dated 17 December 2019 for the amount of $5,783.49 in settlement of the Complainant’s claims. The Complainant signed the discharge voucher and the matter was eventually concluded on around 28 January 2020 when the Complainant collected a cheque of $3,500 from the Firm after paying $700 in cash.
The Chief Justice empanelled a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) presided by Mr Lok Vi Ming SC and Ms Disa Sim Jek Sok as DT member.
One amended charge was proceeded against the Respondent (the Amended Charge):

Amended Charge

For breach of Rules 5(2)(b), 5(2)(e), 5(2)(h) and 17(2)(c) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 in that the Respondent:

issued the Firm’s 26 September 2019 letter to NTUC, rejected their counter-offer of 25 November 2019, and issued the Firm’s further counter-offer of 2 December 2019 to them, without the Complainant’s instructions;
failed to keep the Complainant informed of the matters in (a) above and did not supply copies of any correspondence passing between the Firm and NTUC throughout the entire duration of his handling of the claim; and
failed to give any reasonable advice to the Complainant on his personal injury claim, his right to recover party-party costs from the tortfeasor, and his liability to pay solicitor-client costs to the Firm;

amounting to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b)(i) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (LPA).

Findings and Determination of the DT, Council’s Sanctions

The DT concluded that this is not a case where only reprimand or a censure is appropriate. It is the very core of a legal practitioner’s duty to give proper guidance and advice to a client, especially so where the client may lack certain sophistication and general understanding of the law such as in this case. It was therefore incumbent on the Respondent to give a full breakdown of what the Claimant would be getting in NTUC’s various offers and a proper explanation on the various types of costs he should pay.
However, the DT notes that due consideration should be placed on the fact that the Respondent had pleaded guilty to the Amended Charge on the first day of the hearing on 6 June 2022.
The Respondent had also since returned the sum of $700 which was charged as solicitor-and-client costs to the Complainant. The DT placed great weight on this gesture as the gravamen of the complaint was that the Complainant felt aggrieved that he had to pay the Firm $700 from the damages for his personal injury claim, despite the manner in which the Respondent had handled his matter.
Nevertheless, the DT noted that the Complainant’s dissatisfaction would also have been mitigated or completely avoided if the Respondent kept him informed of the various offers exchanged between NTUC and the Firm, and supplied him copies of the correspondence passing between the Firm and NTUC. He would then at least have had the opportunity to raise queries or objections regarding NTUC’s various offers and would have been aware of the party-and-party costs of $2,283.49 claimed by the Firm instead of only finding out when he received NTUC’s discharge voucher on 2 January 2020.
Therefore, the DT was of the view that the issue of the $700 payment falls squarely within the four corners of the Respondent’s failures as reflected in the Amended Charge.
The DT determined that while there exists no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under section 83 of the LPA, the Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty of pursuant to section 93(1)(b)(i) of the LPA and recommended the sum of $3,500 which the DT considers sufficient and appropriate for the misconduct committed. The DT also ordered the Respondent to pay costs of $4,000 (all-in).
Council accepted the findings of the DT and imposed a financial penalty of $2,500 on the Respondent.

To access the full report, click here.

In the Matter of Nedumaran Muthukrishnan (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor

These proceedings against the Respondent arose from a complaint made by Mr Chan Yee Huat (the Complainant) who was a client of the Respondent from 2013 to 2019. The Respondent was engaged to represent the Complainant in the following lawsuits involving various insurance companies: HC/S 324/2016, HC/S 325/2016 and HC/S 52/2017. The first two suits had their judgments entered into on 3 October 2017 and 10 October 2017 respectively. The defendants in both suits were ordered to pay certain costs and disbursements to the Complainant.
However, the Complainant was made a bankrupt on 13 November 2017. At the Respondent’s request, a part of the judgement sums amounting to approximately $160,395.96 (the sum) was paid to the Respondent’s law firm. Between February to April 2020, the Complainant instructed the Respondent on numerous occasions to utilise the sum to pay various persons nominated by the Complainant.
Despite the Respondent’s numerous instances of assurances via email, the Respondent did not make any payments to the nominated persons, nor did he inform and/or account to the Complainant as to how he had utilised the sum. Subsequently, the Respondent admitted to the Inquiry Committee that when he issued the emails he had already set off the sum against his legal fees and costs. However, no invoice was ever issued to the Complainant with respect to the sum or any part of it that was allegedly set off.
In relation to the complaint, the Chief Justice empanelled a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) presided by Mr Tan Kok Quan, SC and Mr Andrew Chan as DT member.
Four charges (and their alternatives) were preferred against the Respondent:

First Charge

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Chapter 161) (LPA) in that the Respondent had misled the Complainant into believing that he had or would shortly be posting and/or hand-delivering cheques for the payment of persons nominated by the Complainant in circumstances where he did not do so and/or had no intention to do so, in breach of Rule 5(2)(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (PCR).

First Alternative Charge

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that the Respondent had misled the Complainant into believing that he had or would shortly be posting and/or hand-delivering cheques for the payment of persons nominated by the Complainant in circumstances where he did not do so and/or had no intention to do so, thereby breaching Rule 5(2)(a) of the PCR.

Second Charge

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA in that the Respondent was not honest in his dealings with the Complainant and had applied the sum received on behalf of the Complainant towards the settlement of his professional legal fees and costs without obtaining the Complainant’s prior consent, thereby breaching Rule 5(2)(a) of the PCR.

Second Alternative Charge

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that the Respondent was not honest in his dealings with the Complainant and had applied the sum received on behalf of the Complainant towards the settlement of his professional legal fees and costs without obtaining the Complainant’s prior consent, thereby breaching Rule 5(2)(a) of the PCR.

Third Charge

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA in that the Respondent had failed to inform the Complainant of the basis on which your fees for his professional services would be charged and of the manner in which his fees and any disbursements in respect of, inter alia, H/S324/2016, HC/S325/2016 and HC/S52/2017 were to be paid by the Complainant, thereby breaching Rule 17(3)(a) of the PCR.

Third Alternative Charge

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the LPA in that the Respondent had withdrawn the sum from the client account in satisfaction of his solicitor’s costs in circumstances where (a) no bill of costs or other written intimation of the amount of solicitor’s costs incurred was delivered to the Complainant; and (b) the Respondent had failed to notify the Complainant that the sum would be applied towards or in satisfaction of his legal costs, thereby breaching Rule 17(3)(a) of the PCR.

Fourth Charge

For improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the LPA in that the Respondent had withdrawn the sum from the client account in satisfaction of his solicitor’s costs in circumstances where (a) no bill of costs or other written intimation of the amount of solicitor’s costs incurred was delivered to the Complainant; and (b) the Respondent had failed to notify the Complainant that the sum would be applied towards or in satisfaction of his legal costs, thereby breaching Rule 7(1)(a)(iv) of the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Accounts) Rules (the SAR).

Fourth Alternative Charge

The DT had determined pursuant to section 93(1)(c) of the LPA that there is cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act and that the Respondent is to pay the Law Society’s costs of the proceeding in the sum of $10,000 and reasonable disbursements.

Findings of the DT

First Charge (and its Alternative)

The DT found that the Respondent had not been honest in his dealings with the Complainant and had strung the Complainant along by falsely and deliberately concealing the truth from him over a period of one month as he had already set off the $160,000 against his legal fees and costs. The DT noted that the Respondent had misled the Complainant into believing that he had or shortly would be posting and/or hand-delivering cheques for the payment of persons nominated by the Complainant when the Respondent did not do so and/or had no intention of doing so. Thus, the DT determined that the Respondent was guilty of the First Charge (and its alternative) beyond a reasonable doubt.

Second Charge (and its Alternative)

In relation to the Second Charge, it was suggested that the Complainant was never told about the set-off prior to it being effected. The DT found that the Respondent had not been honest in his dealings with the Complainant when he applied the sum towards the settlement of his professional legal fees and costs without obtaining the Complainant’s prior consent and/or without first informing the Complainant of his intention to do so. Thus, the Second Charge (and its alternative) had been made out.

Third Charge (and its Alternative)

On the Third Charge, the Respondent failed to produce any evidence regarding the basis on which his professional legal fees would be charged. There had been no accounting provided by the Respondent during the investigation. Therefore, the DT found that the Respondent had failed to inform the Complainant of the basis on which his fees for professional services would be charged and of the manner in which his fees and any disbursements were to be paid by the Complainant. Hence, the Third Charge (and its alternative) was made out.

Fourth Charge (and its Alternative)

On the Fourth Charge, the Respondent had admitted that he had indeed used the Sum, which was the Complainant’s money and was paid into the client account, to pay his professional legal fees and costs, without issuing any bill of costs or written intimation to the Complainant. As stated by the Court of Three Judges in Law Society of Singapore v Lim Yee Kai [2001] 1 SLR(R) 30 at [17], where rules relating to accounts are breached, disciplinary action is warranted as such contravention of the rules amount to grossly improper conduct in the discharge of a solicitor’s professional duty. Thus, the Fourth Charge (and its alternative) was made out.
In respect of the above Charges, the DT determined that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action existed, with the Respondent to be referred to the Court of Three Judges (C3J). The DT awarded costs amounting to $10,000 and disbursements (to be agreed, if not, taxed) to the Law Society.
The Council adopted the DT’s findings.

The C3J’s findings

On 4 July 2024, the C3J found that the First Charge and the Third Charge had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In respect of the Second Charge, the C3J found that pursuant to section 6(4) of the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act (Cap 189, 2000 Rev Ed) (the MVA), the Respondent was the beneficial owner of the Sum, and that accordingly, the Second Charge had not been made out. Consequently, with regards to the Fourth Charge, the C3J found that the Sum was not client’s money within the meaning of Rule 2 of the SAR and that accordingly, the Fourth Charge, which was premised on a breach of Rule 7(1)(a)(iv) of the SAR, had not been made out. The C3J therefore acquitted the Respondent of the Second and Fourth Charges.
In respect of the First and Third Charges, the C3J ordered the Respondent to be suspended for four (4) years commencing 4 July 2024, with costs in the sum of $12,000 (inclusive of disbursements) be paid to the Law Society of Singapore, and for the costs order of the DT to remain.

To access the full report, click here.

The Singapore Law Gazette